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It may be possible to distinguish Lewis from Winick on the
ground that Lewis contained additional jurisdictional facts. Be-
cause of this difference it will be necessary to await future deci-
sions before predicting with accuracy when New York courts will
exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant on the basis
of acts performed by the plaintiff in New York on the defendant's
behalf. It is evident, however, that if the plaintiff is an employee
of the defendant, jurisdiction will be sustained. The area of un-
certainty lies where the plaintiff is classified as an independent
contractor.
CPLR 308: Parties mtay not provide for their own inethods of
service.
In National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Dec-Wood Corp.,7 4 the
parties entered into a contract whereby the plaintiff corporation,
doing business in New York, leased certain machinery to the non-
domiciliary defendants. The contract stipulated that all actions
arising out of the agreement were to be litigated in New York,
and further provided that any action may be commenced by send-
ing the process by certified mail to the defendants at their out-of-
state address. This suit, to recover rent allegedly unpaid, was
commenced by service in this manner.
The defendants objected to New York's exercise of jurisdic-
tion on the grounds that (1) New York had no basis for jurisdic-
tion since the defendants never transacted business in New York,
and (2) the method of service employed was defective since this
method was not authorized by the CPLR.
The court rejected the defendants' first contention that New
York had no basis for jurisdiction. In so doing, the court was in
accord with prior case law which has established that parties may
designate the forum in which the actions arising out of their con-
tracts are to be adjudicated.75 The court, however, sustained the
contention that the method of service was invalid because it lacked
statutory authorization. The court based this holding upon the
New York State Constitution and those segments of the CPLR
which indicate that the legislature alone may specify methods of
service. The state constitution provides that the legislature shall
have the power to regulate "jurisdiction and proceedings in law
and in equity .. . " " and CPLR 306 states that "proof of service
shall specify . . . that the service was made . . . in an authorized
manner." These factors, together with the additional fact that the
CPLR 77 expressly provides for the manner in which service may
74 49 Misc. 2d 538, 267 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
75Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
71 N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 30.
77CPLR 303, 311, 318.
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be made under various contingencies, led the court to conclude that
the parties could not provide for their own method of service.
In holding that the parties may not prescribe their own pro-
cedural rules, the court in the instant case appears to be supported
by existing New York authority. Prior cases refused to allow
parties to devise new methods of service,78 and have pointed out
that service is ineffective if the statutory requirements are not met.79
In the federal sphere, the United States Supreme Court, in
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,80 interpreted Section
4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides,
in part, that service of process upon an individual may be made
"by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an
agent authorized by appointment . . . to receive service of process."
The Court held that under this section a party may appoint an
agent to receive service of process, although the agent is neither
personally known to the party, nor has expressly consented to
transmit notice to the party, provided, however, that the agent does
in fact give such notice. While this holding may be a liberal inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules, it is not analogous to the situation in
the instant case where the defendants virtually sought to write their
own procedural rules. It may be permissible for parties to liberally
interpret methods of service which already exist in statutory form
but to allow parties to circumvent the CPLR by contract is a re-
sult not to be desired.
CPLR 308(4): Court-devised methods for service of process.
Prior to the CPLR, the methods by which service of process
could be effected were exclusively statutory. With the enactment
of CPLR 308(4), however, the courts, upon ex parte motions,
were given the discretionary power to devise means of service in
cases where it could be shown that the ordinary statutory methods
of service "I had failed. In devising such methods, the court must
examine the individual circumstances of each case and choose a
particular method of service calculated to inform the defendant of
the pendency of the suit. The court is limited in its choice since
the defendant must be afforded "due process of law" as required
by the federal constitution.
78 E.g., Erickson v. Robison, 282 App. Div. 574, 125 N.Y.S.2d 736 (4th
Dep't 1953). The court did not permit the parties to effectively agree
that the mere admission of service by a nonresident who vas not physically
present in the state is equivalent to personal service within New York.79 E.g., Eisenhofer v. New Yorker Zeitung Publishing & Printing Co.,
91 App. Div. 94, 86 N.Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dep't 1904). A similar statement
is made in 3 CARmODY-WAIT, Naw YoRx PRAcnci §24:1 (2d ed. 1965).
80 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
81 The normal statutory methods of service are found in CPLR 308(1)-(3).
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